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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
On about May 10, 1995, Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. filed
a Petition for Extraordinary Relief. On about May 16, 1995, Al Bench
filed a Motion to Dismiss.

After a hearing, the Court entered an

order dated August 30, 1995, denying the Motion to Dismiss. A full
evidentiary hearing was held September 11, 12 and October 10, 1995.
A Final Order of Dismissal in the case was entered December 12, 1995.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal of the Court's ruling on about
November 3, 1995. Respondent/Cross-Appellant filed this Cross-Appeal
on December 26, 1995.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1995 as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL.
1.

Whether the claims raised in the Indian Village Trading

Post, Inc.'s Petition are moot.
2. Whether Indian Village Trading Post, Inc. has another plain,
adequate and speedy remedy available.
3.

Whether Al Bench was an inferior court, administrative

agency or officer exercising the judicial functions as contemplated
by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B.
4.

Whether the review by the Court of Al Bench's discretion

sought in Indian Village Trading Post, Inc.'s Petition is within the
scope of relief contemplated under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B.
II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL.
1.

Did the Court rely on credible evidence in reaching its

decision that the then Fire Chief, Al Bench, acted within his

1

discretion as fire chief in declaring Petitioner's fire protection
system to be inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities?
2. Did the Court err by excluding certain evidence presented by
Petitioner?
3*

The Court should ignore any future reference to issues

raised by Petitioner in its Amended Docketing Statement that were not
addressed in its brief to the Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL.
Motions to dismiss present for review only conclusions of law,

hence the appellate court is free to reappraise the court's legal
conclusions. These conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with no
deference to the trial court's ruling.
872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994); State

West v. Thomson

v. Taylor,

Newspapers,

884 P.2d 1293 (Utah App.

1994) .
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL.
When reviewing trial court decisions, the reviewing court

presumes them to be correct and searches for grounds upon which they
may be upheld.
Co.,

Allen

v. Prudential

Property

839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992).

and Casualty

Insurance

While legal conclusions are

reviewed for correctness, a trial court's findings of fact are given
deferential review as the judge has the opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witnesses.
Finlinson,

Grayson

782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989).

v. JRoper Ltd.

Partnership

v.

When reviewing a trial court's

findings of fact, they are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard.

Gillmor

v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995).

2

The reviewing Court will not overturn a court's decision on the
admissibility

of

evidence

unless

there

has

been

an abuse of

discretion, such that the admission was "beyond the limits of
reasonability."

State

(citations omitted).

v.

Blubaugh,

904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995)

Even if the court erred in admitting the

challenged evidence, the reviewing court will only reverse the lower
court if the error was harmful.

If, absent the error, there is a

reasonable

outcome

likelihood

that

an

more

favorable

to

the

challenging party would have been reached, then error will be found.
Id.

at 699.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue in Petitioner's appeal is whether the Court correctly

found that then Chief Bench relied on reliable and credible evidence
in determining that the Petitioner Indian Village Trading Post,
Inc.'s ("Indian Village") fire fighting system was inadequate for
safe fire fighting capabilities. The Uniform Fire Code ("UFC") vests
the fire chief with ultimate substantive discretion.

Among those

items of discretion included are the fire chief's responsibilities to
designate the location of fire hydrants, determine whether they meet
minimum flow requirements and whether such systems are adequate for
local fire fighting needs.
Indian Village commenced the construction of an addition to a
pre-existing building in late 1990.

In August 1990, then Chief

Bench, accompanied by John Elder of the state Fire Marshal's office,
designated where fire hydrants should be installed.

Indian Village

did not install them where then Chief Bench had designated.

3

Among other things, during the course of construction then Chief
Bench conducted a number of water flow tests on the hydrants to
determine whether they were adequate for local fire fighting needs.
After a final test on November 1, 1991, he determined that while
there was adequate water available from the town system to provide
the required

flow, the

Petitioner's

hydrant

configuration

inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities.

was

He based this

decision on several factors; the age of his equipment, the lack of
training of his men, the fact that town fire fighters are all
volunteers, the location of the Indian Village complex as well as the
results from the water flow test.
Petitioner utilized its administrative remedies and appealed
then Chief Bench's decision.

Two specially convened Review Boards

upheld then Chief Bench's decision at every point along the way in
the course of construction.

Thereupon, Petitioner brought the suit

in the District Court which was ultimately dismissed.
allowed its time for appeal to lapse.

Petitioner

Ultimately, Petitioner filed

a petition for an extraordinary writ and a hearing was granted.
After the hearing and before a Final Order of Dismissal was entered
by the District Court, Petitioner filed this appeal. Respondent has
filed a Cross-Appeal based on the Fifth District Court's order on
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Al Bench was the Fire Chief and Fire Marshall for the

Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District during the years of
1990, 1991 and part of 1992.

4

2.

Indian Village is the owner of real property located in the

town of Springdale and was constructing a 12,000 square foot addition
to existing improvements from late 1990 through early 1992.

R.

00743.
3.

As the Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, among many other

things done in his official capacity, Al Bench conducted a water flow
test on hydrants located on and around Indian Village's property on
July 12, 1991.

R. 00506.

These hydrants had not been installed

where then Chief Bench had designated.
4.

R. 00746.

As the then Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, Al Bench placed

a red tag on Indian Village's construction project on about July 13,
and again on about August 15, 1991. R. 00002.
5. Again, based on the decisions and actions taken by then
Chief Bench, Indian Village filed an appeal with the Fire Protection
District.

R.

00692.

This

appeals

panel

was

composed

of

disinterested parties from the community, not members of the Fire
Protection District.

R. 00069.

After reviewing the complaint and

the evidence, this special panel determined that then Chief Bench was
acting within his authority and discretion and upheld his decisions
to that point.
6.

R. 00132, 00761.

As the then Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, on about November

1, 1991, Al Bench conducted another water flow test.
7.

R. 00931.

By letter dated December 10, 1991, Al Bench, as the then

Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, notified Indian Village, of the results
of the November 1, 1991 flow test.
8.

R. 00063.

At that time, Indian Village's fire protection system was

deemed to be inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities.

5

Id.

9.

As the then Fire Chief and Fire Marshall, in his December

10, 1991 letter to Indian Village, Al Bench proposed four solutions
to Indian Village to rectify the problem of its inadequate fire
fighting system.
10.

Jd.

Pursuant to Indian Village's request, a special Board of

Appeals was convened on January 30, 1992, to review, among other
things, the results of the November 1, 1991 flow test.

R. 00709,

00786.
11.

The January 30, 1992 Appeals Board upheld the determination

of Al Bench in all respects and, in particular, with regard to the
November 1, 1991 flow test.
12.

R. 00132.

In about March 1992, Al Bench resigned as Fire Chief and

about July of 1994, resigned as Fire Marshall for the RockvilleSpringdale Fire Protection District.
13.

In or about March, 1991, Petitioner filed suit in the Fifth

District Court, seeking among other things, a preliminary injunction
to have the red-tags lifted.

The Court denied the request.

R.

00031.
14.

In or about April, 1992, the Fifth District Court dismissed

Petitioner's lawsuit without prejudice.
the dismissal.

Rather, shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed suit in

Federal District Court.
15.

Petitioner did not appeal

R. 00031.

On about May 10, 1994, Indian Village filed a Petition for

Extraordinary Relief before the Fifth District Court requesting that
the Court review the November 1, 1991 test and determine if the test
showed that the system was not adequate for safe
capabilities.

R. 00001.

6

fire

fighting

16.

On about May 16, 1995, Al Bench filed a Motion to Dismiss

Indian Village's Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
17.

R. 00028.

After a hearing, the Court entered an order dated August

30, 1995, denying the Motion to Dismiss the Petition.
18.

R. 00092.

A full evidentiary hearing was held on Indian Village's

Petition, which spanned three days, September 11, 1995, September 13,
1995, and October 10, 1995. R. 00472-01022.
19.

The Court entered a Memorandum Decision dismissing Indian

Village's Petition which was reduced to an Order of Dismissal and
entered on December 12, 1995. R. 00131, 00163.
20.

Indian Village filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's

ruling on about November 3, 1995 after issuance of the Fifth District
Court's Memorandum Decision.

R. 00149.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
CROSS-APPEAL
Utah

Courts

only

decide

actual

controversies.

Where

no

controversy lies, the case will be deemed moot and Utah Courts will
not adjudicate moot cases.

Petitioner filed this action against Al

Bench as the then Fire Marshall and Fire Chief of the RockvilleSpringdale Fire Protection District. Al Bench, however, is no longer
either the Fire Marshall or the Fire Chief. The Fire District, under
whose authority Al Bench served, is not a party to the action below.
Any order entered by the Fifth District Court on Indian Village's
Petition would have utterly no affect.
As a result of the Petitioner's refusal to comply with his
directives during the course of construction, then Chief Bench redtagged

the

Indian

Village

complex

7

for

having

inadequate

fire

protection, among other things.

By March of 1992, Petitioner

complied with the requirements set forth by then Chief Bench and the
red-tags were lifted.

These actions, along with the fact that Al

Bench is no longer the Fire Chief or Fire Marshall, have eliminated
any controversy that may have existed, thus rendering this case moot.
To render an opinion in this case would be to render an advisory
opinion and Utah Courts do not give advisory opinions.
Under Utah law, an extraordinary writ is only issued if the
petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy available
to it. An extraordinary writ is not appropriate when the purpose for
which it is sought is to appeal an administrative decision.

In the

spring of 1991, Petitioner filed suit before the Fifth District Court
seeking a preliminary injunction to lift the red-tags then Chief
Bench had placed on its property.

The Court refused to grant the

preliminary injunction. That case was eventually dismissed in early
1992.

Rather than appeal that decision to the appropriate Court of

Appeals,
Petitioner

Petitioner

filed

subsequently

a

filed

suit
the

in

Federal

instant

District

action

extraordinary writ in the Fifth District Court.

Court.

seeking

an

Notably, every

action filed by Petitioner is based on the same operative factual
scenario. Petitioner failed to assert in its Petition that it has no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy nor did it make any showing
of extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion.

The purpose

of Rule 65B is not, as attempted here, to salvage what is otherwise
an untimely appeal.
Al Bench is neither an inferior court, an officer exercising
judicial functions or an administrative agency. As such, the relief

8

sought by Petitioner is beyond that provided under Rule 65B. Nor did
Al Bench fail to perform an act required by law.

Overall, the type

of review sought by Petitioner was not within the scope of review
contemplated by Rule 65B.
Finally, the fire chief's discretionary decisions are given
considerable deference and will not be overturned

if based on

substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is
permissible and even if he made a mistake.

Petitioner wanted the

Court to determine that then Chief Bench made the wrong decision and
then reverse it. This is not the type of review contemplated by Rule
65B.

Despite these flaws in the Petition, the Court erroneously

granted Petitioner's request for a hearing.
PETITIONER'S APPEAL
When the District Court found that Al Bench had relied on
credible, supporting

evidence, but before

the

Final

Order of

Dismissal was entered, Petitioner filed this appeal.

Petitioner

asserts that the District Court's findings are clearly erroneous and
are not supported by the evidence. However, Petitioner has failed to
marshall the evidence to support such a contention.

The Court,

sitting alone, had the opportunity to review all the documents and
hear all the testimony, including testimony from three experts.
These experts included Charles B. Tandy, a sixteen-year veteran fire
fighter, who in addition to having fought countless fires, has
conducted numerous water flow tests, John Elder, a representative
from

the

state

Fire

Marshall's

office,

certified

in

the

interpretation of the UFC, and an academician, John Mertens, who
while having studied what fire fighters do and understands the

9

physics of water flow tests, has never actually fought fires nor is
certified in the interpretation of the code.

Based on the evidence

before the Court and especially relying on the testimony of Mr. Elder
and Mr. Tandy, and taking into consideration its experience, the
Court determined that Al Bench did not abuse his discretion in
determining

that

the

Indian Village

fire

fighting

system was

inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities.
Petitioner also argues that the Court erred in excluding certain
pieces of evidence. Unless the lower Court abused its discretion in
excluding

evidence, a reviewing

court will

not

overturn

that

decision.

The excluded evidence, the testimony of a non-disclosed

expert and his flow calculations, which were relied on by John
Mertens in his testimony, supra,

was already before the Court, but

more importantly was determined by the Fifth District Court to be
irrelevant.

The Court below was justified

in excluding

such

evidence.
While subtle principles of law state that a court need not
address issues that a party has not briefed, failure to brief issues
cannot be cured by addressing them in a reply brief as this presents
the non-moving party from responding.

Therefore, any attempt to

address issues raised in an amended docketing statement but not
raised in the original brief filed with the Court, should be ignored.
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ARGUMENT
I.

CROSS-APPEAL.
A.

THE ISSUES RAISED IK THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND AS SUCH,
THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

For an issue to remain justiciable, it must remain alive
throughout the duration of the litigation, to the moment of final
appellate

review.

Because

some

events

overtake

the pace of

litigation, causing an issue to become moot, courts are reluctant to
M

waste their limited resources simply to satisfy curiosity or a naked

desire for vindication."
and Procedure:

Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal

Practice

Jurisdiction 2d § 3533.

Utah Courts will only decide actual controversies. To render an
opinion in a moot case would be to render an advisory opinion and
Utah Courts do not give advisory opinions. Reynolds
P,2d X044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990).

v. Reynolds,

788

A case becomes moot when the

judicial relief requested cannot affect the rights of the litigants.
Bennion

v. Sundance Development

Corporation,

1995).

When an issue or case becomes moot, "fundamental principals

897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App.

of procedure dictate that [courts] not adjudicate moot cases..."
Stromqist

v. Cokayne,

646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982).

In Stromquist,

the

plaintiffs brought an action against the Salt Lake County Assessor,
Auditor, and Treasurer to force them to comply with their respective
duties under the Utah Code.

Jd. at 747.

On a motion for summary

judgment, the trial court found "that by the time of the hearing, the
County Assessor
duties." Id.

had

substantially

complied

with

his

statutory

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "in seeking to

compel the defendants to perform

11

certain

acts which had been

performed even before the hearing in the trial court, the cases were
moot from the beginning...M Id.

at 748.

Of utmost importance to this issue is the fact that Al Bench is
no longer the Fire Chief or Fire Marshall.

Therefore, any order

directing him to perform any action would have no effect as he is no
longer in any position of authority.

Moreover, the Fire Protection

District under which Al Bench served as Fire chief and Marshall is
not a party to the action below.

What is more, there is no action

that can be taken or any order issued that would have any affect as
the red-tags on Petitioner's property have long since been lifted and
Petitioner's fire protection system approved.

Therefore, any order

in this case would be, at best, an advisory opinion, and Utah Courts
do not render advisory opinions. Reynolds,

788 P.2d at 1045.

Furthermore, the actions of the parties have rendered this issue
moot. Indian Village complied with then Fire Chief's requirements of
making its fire protection system safe.
the red tags.

R. 00801.

Al Bench lifted

Indian Village completed construction of its project

and subsequently opened for business. R. 00804. These actions alone
have eliminated any controversy that may have existed between the
parties.

Reynolds,

788 P.2d at 1045. However, as stated supra,

Al

Bench is no longer the Fire Chief and cannot be compelled to take any
action in this case.

The only basis for this appeal is Indian

Village's insatiable need to feel it has been vindicated. Petitioner
simply wants the Court to tell Al Bench that he was wrong.
discussed in greater detail infra,

As

that purpose is an improper basis

for review.
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B.

INDIAN VILLAGE HAD ANOTHER PLAIN/ ADEQUATE AND SPEEDY
REMEDY.

Petitioner originally sought relief from the Court under Rule
65B(e)(2) (A) and/or (B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Relief
under this rule may be granted:
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion;
(B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation
or person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty
of office, trust or station;
Utah R. Civ, P. 65B(e)(2)(A),(B). However, relief under this rule
may only be granted where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). If other avenues
of relief are available to Petitioner, it must avail itself of those
other remedies. If it chooses to ignore a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law, it will place itself out of reach of an extraordinary
writ.

Crist

v. Mapleton

Merrihew v. Salt

City,

497 P.2d 633, 634

Lake County Planning

(Utah 1972);

and Zoning Commission,

659 P.2d

1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).
Throughout the continuing dispute between then Chief Bench and
Petitioner, Petitioner

repeatedly

sought

decision through administrative channels.
before two separate Appeals Boards.

review

of Al

Bench's

Petitioner has appeared

Petitioner has appeared before

the Fire Protection District and before two separate specially called
Appeals Boards.

R. 00069, 00709.

upheld Al Bench's decision.

In every instance, these Boards

R. 00132.

When it was not satisfied

with the determinations of the Fire District, Petitioner filed suit
in the Fifth District Court.

R. 00132.
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After several months of

wrangling, the Fifth District Court, dismissed Petitionees claims.
R. 00132.

Rather than pursue the obvious plain and appropriate

remedy, that is an appeal of the District Court's decision to the
appropriate Court of Appeals, Petitioner waited for over a year and
then sought an extraordinary writ. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(4).
Commercial

Security

Bank v.

Phillips,

See

655 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1980)

(Recourse was to pursue remedy of appeal).

Petitioner also filed a

lawsuit in the Federal District Court for violation of its civil
rights based entirely on the same factual scenario reviewed by two
appeals boards, the Fifth District and sometime later, resurrected in
the form of this action for extraordinary relief.

The petition, on

its face fails to assert that no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy existed, nor did Petitioner make any showing of extraordinary
circumstances of any nature to support the granting the relief
demanded.
Jenkins

"For these

v. Bishop,

reasons

alone

the

writ

could

be

denied."

589 P. 2d 770, 772 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).

The law is clear that "a writ is not a substitute for other
remedies which are available in the regular course of judicial
process."

Merrihew,

659 P.2d at 1067.

In Merrihew,

the plaintiff

sought a writ of mandamus directing reinstatement of its building
permit.

The court held, however, that by "ignoring a plain, speedy

and adequate remedy at law, plaintiff/s placed themselves out of
reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is
not a substitute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to serve
the purpose of appeals, certiorari, or writ of error."

Id.

at 1067.

If a party once had an adequate remedy by appeal, but permits it to
lapse, he does so at his own peril and cannot rely on relief by use
14

of an extraordinary writ. Anderson
1956)•

v. Baker,

296 P.2d 283, 286 (Utah

Because Petitioner had lost its right to appeal, in hopes of

obtaining relief, Petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary
relief.

However, despite the fact that the District Court granted

its request, it was improper to do so.

Id.

That the Petitioner here allowed the time for an appeal to
lapse, does not defeat the requirement or lead to the conclusion that
Petitioner did not have another plain, adequate and speedy remedy.
If this were the case, litigants could circumvent the time limit
imposed on appeal whenever it suited their fancy.
Baicer, 296 P.2d 283, 286 (Utah 1956).

See Anderson

v.

This is not the purpose or

function of Rule 65B.
C.

AL BENCH IS NOT AN INFERIOR COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OR
OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.

Relief under Rule 65B(e) can be granted if an "inferior court,
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions" has
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion or has failed to
perform an act required by law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (2) (A) (B) .

Petitioner failed to allege or show how Al Bench acted in any of
these capacities, that jurisdiction or discretion had been abused or
how an act required by law was not performed.
1.

Failure to perform an act required by law.

Beginning with the latter, Petitioner has failed to allege or
show that then Chief Bench "failed to perform an act required by law
as a duty of his office, trust or station."

Utah R. Civ. P.

65B(e)(2)(B). Rather, Petitioner has brought this action because of
an action that the then Chief Bench was required to take under the
15

UFC. The typical action brought under 65B(e)(2)(B) is exemplified in
Preece

v. House,

886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994). In Preece,

the Petitioner

sought extraordinary relief to force the Board of Pardons to comply
with its own administrative rules.

Jd. at 512. Petitioner was not

asking the Court to force Al Bench to comply with anything.

On the

contrary, all Petitioner wanted the Court to do was examine the
discretionary decision of then Chief Bench and reverse that decision.
See Petition R. 00001-00003.
2.

Al Bench is neither an inferior court nor an officer
exercising judicial functions.

Clearly Al Bench is not an inferior court1 nor is he an officer
exercising judicial functions. An officer vested with the authority
to exercise judicial functions has the authority to: determine
questions of admissibility of evidence and the existence of a
privilege2, exclude irrelevant evidence3, take notice of adjudicative
facts4, as well as make findings of fact and conclusions of law5, and
impose sentences6.

Those carrying out judicial functions are also

1

The following are Courts of Justice and Record: the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, district courts, circuit courts,
juvenile courts, and justice courts. Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1.
2

Education,

Utah Rules of Evidence, 104(a); Ambus v. State
858 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1993).

3

Utah Rules of Evidence, 402.

4

Utah Rules of Evidence, 201.

5

Utah R. Civ P. 52.

*

Thurston,

Salt

Lake

City

v.

Ohms,

Board

881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994); State

781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989).
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of

v.

subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct7 as well as the Judicial
Code8.

As the former volunteer Fire Chief and Fire Marshall he did

not and does not possess any of these qualities nor he is subject to
these sections of the code.
3.

Administrative agency.

Similarly,

Al

Bench

is

not

an

"administrative

agency."

Administrative agencies have been described as having "members,"
being appointed by a legislative official, for specified periods of
time, having delineated purposes and objectives as well as reasonable
rules and regulations. Great

Salt

Lake Authority

Company, 414 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah 1966), see also
511,

v. Island
Preece,

Ranching

886 P.2d at

(Board of Pardons has administrative rules governing

actions.)

its

At best, Al Bench was one representative of a Fire

District, operating under the authority of that district and the
discretion allowed the fire chief under the Uniform Fire Code.
D.

THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE
CONTEMPLATED BY RULE 65B.

In deciding whether to grant a petition for extraordinary
relief, a court looks at the following factors: (1) the nature of the
relief sought; (2) the circumstances alleged in the petition; and (3)
the purpose of the type of writ sought. Renn v. Utah State
Pardons

Board of

904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995).

In its Petition, Petitioner set forth facts stating that the
then Fire Chief had placed red tags on Petitioner's building project

7

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Utah Court Rules Ann.,

ch. 12.
8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1 et. seg.
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alleging that the fire protection system was inadequate.
00003.

R. 00001-

Petitioner then avers that a water flow test conducted on

November 1, 1991 showed that the system was in compliance with Table
III-A of the Uniform Fire Code but that the then Fire Chief would not
lift the red tags, stating that the test showed that the system was
not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. Petitioner sought
to have the Court review then Chief Bench's conclusions from the
November 1, 1991 test and see if it complied with Table III-A of the
UFC and whether hydrant number three was dangerous by taking evidence
on these issues. R. 00002
In considering a petition for an extraordinary writ the District
Court reviews the process, rather than the decision. When reviewing
the fire chiefs discretionary decisions, his findings of fact will be
"accorded substantial deference and will not be overturned if based
on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence
is permissible." Hurley

v. Board of Review of Industrial

Commission,

767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988). It is not the Court's position to
second guess the fire chief, but examine whether he abused his
discretion.

Upon examination of Petitioner's request, it is clear

that the "nature of the relief" it is seeking is to have the Court
review

and

reverse

the

decision, not

to

review

the process.

Petitioner wants the Court to make the determination that Al Bench
was wrong, as fire chief, when he determined that Indian Village's
fire protection system was inadequate for fire protection, R. 00741,
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or that he falsified9 the results. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant
Hurley,

at 47. This is not within the scope of review of the Court.
767 P.2d at 526-27.

Al Bench may even have reached the wrong

conclusion from information gathered at the flow test, but that does
not justify the issuance of an extraordinary writ. Id.

at 526. The

appropriate consideration on review is whether then Chief Bench had
substantial evidence on which to base his determination.
Petitioner has failed to satisfy Renn's

Id.

first requirement, in that

the nature of the relief in Petitioner's Petition is not comprehended
under Rule 65B. Renn,

904 P.2d at 682.

Second, as set forth more fully in response to Petitioner's
appeal infra,

Petitioner failed to show facts adequate to satisfy the

circumstances requirement of Renn.

Id.

There were no facts

presented to indicate that Al Bench abused his discretion as fire
chief.

Finally, Petitioner's attempt to utilize 65B as a basis for

an appeal and reversal of the then Fire Chief Al Bench's decisions is
an inappropriate purpose for Rule 65B. Petitioner fails Renn's
requirement.

Jd.; see also,

Merrihew,

659 P.2d at 1067;

third

Anderson,

296 P.2d at 286.

9

It is curious to note that Petitioner now claims that Al
Bench falsified the results of the November 1, 1991 test. At the
Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner's claims were quite
different. Petitioner stated, "We accept the water flow test that
he has stated in certain letters. There is no factual argument.
The test. [In regards to the November 1, 1991 water flow test.]
We're not questioning any of the facts, and whether that complies."
Later, Petitioner states, "We're accepting everything, Your Honor.
We say what he said the results do." Relevant portions of the
hearing transcript on the Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition
for Extraordinary Relief are attached hereto as Addendum "A" and
made a part hereof.
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Even overcoming the mootness and scope of relief problems

supra,

if the Court were to do what Petitioner had hoped it would, that is,
review and overturn Al Bench's 1991 decisions, it would defeat the
purpose of the separation of powers system of government.

The Utah

Supreme Court stated, "Where the responsibility for basic policy
decisions has been committed to one of the branches of our tripartite system of government, the courts have refrained from sitting
in judgment of the propriety of those decisions."
State

Division

Keegan v. State

of

Family

of Utah,

Services,

Little

v.

Utah

667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983);

896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995).

The very relief sought by Petitioner in its Petition is not
comprehended in Rule 65B, and on that basis, as well as the other
bases set forth above, the Fifth District Court erred in denying
Respondent Al Bench's Motion to Dismiss.
II.

ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF.
A.

UNDER THE UNIFORM FIRE CODE, THE FIRE CHIEF IS GIVEN BROAD
DISCRETION IN ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING THE CODE.

At the time of the November 1, 1991 water flow test, the city of
Springville had adopted the 1988 version of the UFC.

Section 2.101

of the UFC gives the fire chief responsibility for administering and
enforcing the code.

His duties include regulating the installation

and maintenance of fire-extinguishing equipment as well as the
maintenance of fire-protection equipment on existing structures and
property as well as under construction.

Uniform Fire Code, § 2.101

(1988). Section 2.102 authorizes the fire chief to "make and enforce
such rules and regulations for the prevention and control of fires
and fire hazards as may be necessary from time to time to carry out
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the intent of this code." Uniform Fire Code, §2.102 (1988). See §§
2.101 and 2.102, Uniform Fire Code.

Relevant portions of the 1988

Uniform Fire Code are attached hereto as Addendum "B" and made a part
hereof.
Section 10.301 (1988) of the UFC relates to the installation and
maintenance of fire protection, life-safety systems and appliances
and states in part:
(a) Type Required. The Chief shall designate the type and number
of fire appliances to be installed and maintained in and upon
all buildings and premises in the jurisdiction other than
private dwellings. This shall be done according to the relative
severity of probable fire, including the rapidity with which it
may spread. Such Appliances shall be of a type suitable for the
probable class of fire associated with such building or premises
and shall have approval of the
Chief.
(b) Special Hazards. In occupancies of an especially hazardous
nature or where special hazards exist in addition to the normal
hazard of the occupancy, or where access for fire apparatus is
unduly difficult, additional safeguards may be required
consisting of additional fire appliance units, more than one
type of appliance, or special systems suitable for the
protection of the hazard involved...
Uniform Fire Code § 10.301 (emphasis added). See Addendum "B." The
UFC defines approval as follows: "Approved refers to approval by the
chief as the result of investigation and tests conducted by him or by
reason of accepted principles or tests by national authorities,
technical or scientific organizations."
(1988).

Uniform Fire Code § 9.103

See Addendum "B."

Section (c) of § 10.301 refers to the water supply to a fire
fighting system.

It states that "there shall be provided, when

required by the chief, on-site fire hydrants and mains capable of
supplying the required fire flow."

Uniform Fire Code § 10.301(c).

The code specifically states that the chief may be "guided
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by the

provisions of Appendix

III-A" of the code in determining

the

requirement for water flow for a fire protection system. Uniform Fire
Code § 10.301(c) (1988), (emphasis added).

See Addendum "B."

It

also states that the Chief is to approve the location, number and
type of fire hydrants connected to the water supply capable of
delivering the required water flow. Uniform Fire Code § 10.301(c)
(1988).
Section (f) of § 10.301 states that fire hydrant systems "shall
meet the approval of the fire department as to installation and
location and shall be subject to such periodic tests as required by
the chief.

Plans and specifications shall be submitted to the fire

department for review and approval prior to construction."
Fire Code, § 10.301(f).

Uniform

See Addendum "B."

John T. Elder, the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the
State Fire Marshal's Office of the State of Utah, certified in the
interpretation of the fire code, concurred that the UFC gives the
Fire Chief broad discretion in the implementation of the code.
00810.

R.

It was his testimony that the code endows fire chiefs with

"almost unlimited discretion" because:
every community is so different in their makeup and their
equipment and their training and their manpower — whether
they're a paid department or a — a volunteer department... You
can go through the entire code, and it — it repeatedly says
with the chief's approval or — or the discretion of the chief,
or — or it — it's full of this. Because it realizes that
there's just no black and whites out there.
R. 00859.

Mr. Elder did, however, acknowledge that the fire chief

would need to be able to justify his decisions based on a rational
basis.

R. 00860.

This rational basis would include the chief's

manpower, their training or the fact that the chief would not want to
22

use a particular hydrant.

R. 00860.

In regards to the table in

Appendix III-A of the UFC, Mr. Elder echoed the code in that this
table is merely provided to be a guideline, despite the fact that a
community may adopt the code.
Because that's what the —
the text." R. 00857.
B.

"It would be guidelines still.

the way it's referred to in the body of

"That's why it's in the appendix." R. 00858.

THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY THEN FIRE CHIEF, AL BENCH, WAS
RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE AND THEREFORE SUPPORTED HIS FINDINGS,
AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE COURT'S, THAT INDIAN VILLAGE
TRADING POST, INC.'S FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE.
1.

"Findings

Trial Court's
erroneous•
of

findings

fact, whether

of

based

fact

on

are

oral

or

not

clearly

documentary

evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses."

Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a).

A

finding of fact is clearly erroneous "if it is against the clear
weight of evidence or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Wadsworth

Construction

v. City

of

St.

George,

Cal

898 P.2d 1372 (Utah

1995).
When determining whether a factual finding is clearly erroneous,
courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's determination, and if the court's determination is
based on sufficient evidence, then the finding is not clearly
erroneous.

Gillmor,

904 P.2d at 706.

Finally,

[t]he clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential to the
trial court's decisions because the witnesses and parties appear
before the trial court and the evidence is presented there.
Thus, the trial judge is * considered to be in the best position
to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of
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the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot
hope to garner from a cold record,7
Id.

(citations omitted).

If, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the trial court's determination, the court's
findings are based on sufficient evidence, such findings will not be
clearly erroneous.

Id.

Over the course of three days, evidence was presented to the
Court on the issue of whether then fire chief, Al Bench, abused his
discretion in reaching his conclusion, based on the water flow test
conducted on November 1, 1991 that Indian Village's fire protection
system was inadequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. R. 0047201022.
During the course of the hearing, testimony was presented by
both parties.

This testimony included expert witnesses, references

to computer simulations, R. 00566, as well as testimony from the
parties themselves.

After the evidence had been presented and

arguments made, based on the Court's own "knowledge,,f "judgment" and
"competency," the Court evaluated the evidence and made its decision.
Hardy v. Hardy,

116 P.d 917, 925 (Utah App. 1989). After hearing all

the evidence presented, the Court was convinced and found that Al
Bench relied on credible supporting evidence in determining that the
Indian Village water supply system created a hazardous situation.
2.

Evidence relied on by Al Bench and presented to the
Court.
i.

Placement of the hydrants.

Late in 1990, Indian Village commenced construction of a 12,000
plus square foot addition to an already existing building. R. 00743.
On or about August 29, 1990, Al Bench, accompanied by John Elder
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visited the construction site and indicated where two hydrants should
be located.

R. 00744-00745, 00811-00813.

Terry West, owner of

Petitioner, testified himself that he knew in August where then Chief
Bench wanted the fire hydrants located.

R. 00746.

On or about

November 1, 1990, Indian Village installed two hydrants, which are
now known as hydrants number two and three, neither of which were in
the locations designated by the Fire Chief.

R. 00746.

Indian

Village did not install the hydrants where then Chief Bench and Mr.
Elder had indicated, despite the fact that both the Fire Chief and
the Fire Marshal's office believed that the locations had been
designated in August, 1990.

R. 00813, 00987.

In fact, Mr. Elder

stated that "I felt like it was concluded that that's where the
hydrant —

hydrants were going to go, and that Terry West had agreed

to that.

And —

and when I left the site, I was confident that

that's where the hydrants would go."

R. 00813.

On cross-examination of Mr. West:

ff

you didn't put them in the

locations they suggested, did you, sir?" lfNo, sir."

R. 00746.

In

fact, Mr. West stated, in regards to the location of the hydrants, "I
wanted one in one place, and Al wanted it in another place."
00748.

R.

So despite the fact that Indian Village recognized that the

Fire Chief had the discretion and authority to designate the location
of the fire hydrants, R. 00749, Indian Village placed the hydrants in
a different location, where it wanted them.

R. 00740.

Petitioner argues at length that there had been no official
designation of the fire hydrants by then Chief Bench.

Petitioner

cites, as supporting this contention, a letter that then Chief Bench
wrote to the town of Springdale on November 5, 1990. In that letter,
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he stated that no hydrant designation had been made.

This is an

instance where Petitioner claims then Chief Bench tried to deceive
the trial Court. On the witness stand, Al Bench explained the basis
for making such a statement in that letter, despite having testified
that the hydrants were designated in August, 1990.
I used that language in that letter as a stop sign to prevent
Mr. West from going forward with this project, because the
hydrants were being placed somewhere I didn't want them. And at
that point, I felt it necessary to use the language "there's no
official designation," because had Mr. West been using the right
process, he would not go forward without my proper designation.
I was a little exasperated by what was going on at that time,
because the hydrants were going in where I did not want them.
I thought at that time if I used that language as a stop sign,
it was to say, "They need to be where I want them, not where you
want them." That was really the message.
R.

00966. The language referred to as evidence of deception by Al

Bench is at worst, unartful.
evidence of dishonesty.

Indeed the Court below found no

The hydrants were not, in fact, installed

where they had been designated.

Rather, they were installed where

Petitioner wanted to install them, without the authorization of then
Fire Chief, Al Bench.
ii.

Flow Tests.

In March of 1991, John Elder conducted a flow test.

"This was

after I became aware that these two hydrants [numbers two and three]
had been placed in the back contrary to what I thought was going to
happen. And — and I was a little concerned, because they were both
on a six inch dead end line...[and] we don't permit two hydrants to
be placed on a six inch dead end line..." R. 00814.

As a result of

the March 1991 test, it was determined that there was insufficient
flow to the hydrants,

R. 00815.
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Mr. Elder, then directed that

another flow test be conducted.

The reason for another test was to

determine whether hydrant number three was dry or if there was any
significant flow.

If the hydrant was dry or had insignificant flow,

then Indian Village would have been required to run the fire line to
the north and connect it to the line on the highway, thus providing
a

looped

system.

R.

00854,

See

Exhibit

,f

E,M

Brief

of

Petitioner/Appellant.
Mr. Elder conducted this subsequent test on July 2, 1991.

He

did not require Indian Village to loop the system because he turned
the responsibility of dealing with the results and handling the
situation over to Chief Bench.

R. 00854. The results of that test

indicated that there was only 1,800 gallons per minute ("GPM")
flowing from the two hydrants and that there was a needed flow of
2,750 to 3,000 GPM.

R. 00759.

This test was done using borrowed

equipment, the reliability of which, Chief Bench was unsure of.
00692.

R.

As a result of that test, the fire district insisted that

Indian Village install a third hydrant for adequate water flow and
fire protection.
A third flow test was conducted on July 12, 1991. By this time,
the number one hydrant had been installed.

Using the same borrowed

equipment, flow tests were conducted on hydrants one, two and three.
Hydrant number one flowed 2,120 GPM, number two, 1,344 GPM and number
three 822 GPM, however, not all hydrants were flowing simultaneously.
Number one was tested when flowing by itself. Number two was tested
with number one flowing.

Then, when number three was tested, all

three hydrants were flowing. R. 00518-00520. The test was conducted
this way in response to Mr. Elder's request to determine what the
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water flow would be to hydrant number three if all three hydrants
were flowing.

R. 00522.

Based on the results of the test, Chief Bench concluded that
there was insufficient water flow to hydrant number three. R. 00761.
Several suggestions were then made to Indian Village on ways to make
the system safe.

These alternatives included looping the system,

installing a sprinkler system or installing another hydrant.

R.

00770-00771.
Because Chief Bench had been using borrowed equipment, the
accuracy of which was questionable, he had the Fire District purchase
its own equipment so that he could conduct another flow test of the
hydrant system.

This final test took place on November 1, 1991. R.

000063.
While he had been trained in his fire science courses on how to
conduct water flow tests, to ensure that he conducted the flow test
correctly, Chief Bench contacted the fire academy to make sure he was
using correct methods. R. 00932.
After consulting with an instructor at the academy, Chief Bench
conducted the water flow test of Indian Village7s hydrants.

Even

though there was a fourth hydrant, Chief Bench did not test that one.
It was not an accepted hydrant because it was located under a power
line, which fact had been previously communicated to Petitioner. R.
00933.
Charles Tandy, a battalion chief and sixteen year veteran with
the Provo City Fire Department, testified that he has conducted many
water flow tests and that Al Bench tested the hydrants as he would
have tested them.

R. 00872.
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Chief Bench conducted the test with the following results:
It was determined that the flow from hydrant #1, located on Hwy
9 in front of your establishment on the 10" water line, produced
2120 GPM. The pitot gauge read 40 PS I (pounds per square inch)
with two 2 1/2" ports flowing and the #3 hydrant flowing
(located at the southeast corner of your establishment). The #3
hydrant had one 2 1/2" port flowing and showed a pitot reading
of 24 PSI which produced 820 GPM.
The #2 hydrant...was used to determine the static pressure of 70
PSI, and the residual pressure of 43 PSI. The combined flow of
the #1 and #3 hydrants was 2940 GPM at 43 PSI residual pressure.
R. 00063.
While the test showed that there was adequate water available
from the town to provide the required 2750 GPM flow, the calculations
showed that:
at 20 PSI, only 1090 GPM is available to the #2 and #3 hydrants
on the dead end 6" line with the #1 hydrant flowing. This
reenforces the previous tests conducted by Jon Elder and myself
which showed poor fire flow from those hydrants. The system is
not adequate for safe firefighting capabilities.
R. 00063.
Al Bench testified before the Court, citing the reasons why he
concluded the fire protection system was inadequate and unsafe.

He

based his conclusions on the fact that there was 820 GPM available
out of hydrant three, that it was on a dead-end, six-inch line, and
if another engine were to hook up to hydrant two and begin pumping,
that hydrant three would be rendered inoperable.

Therefore he

determined that is was not safe and required Mr. West to correct the
inadequacy.

R. 00937.

It was his fear that if two pumpers were

hooked up to hydrants two and three, they would compete for water,
and depending on how strong the competition, the system runs the risk
of collapse and the pumps of cavitation.
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R. 00938.

Al Bench testified that he relied on several other factors in
reaching his conclusion.

He considered the experience and training

of his fire fighters, which was minimal. They are all volunteer fire
fighters, who respond to a fire when summoned.
also considered his equipment.

R. 00938-00939.

He

At that time, his primary response

unit was a 1948 Maxim truck, with a water pump gauge that was
unreliable and that may or may not have worked. R. 00939, 00949. It
was also necessary to consider that the Indian Village complex was
located in downtown Springdale, the most congested part of town. R.
00939.

Next, the then Chief Bench considered the water supply

available across the street.

This was a 40 year old system and he

did not trust the water lines, fearing that they could break if too
much water was drawn from them10.

R. 00939-00940.

He also had to

take into account the immediate exposures. Next door, approximately
twenty feet away, was a "bed & breakfast" with a wood shingled roof.
The radiant heat from a fire could cause such a building to easily
catch fire. R. 00940.

Finally, Chief Bench realized that he would

have to rely on mutual aid agreements with Zion National Park and
Hurricane City. Mutual aid agreements mean that if Springdale had a
fire larger than it could handle, either or both of these other fire
departments would send a unit to assist in putting out the fire. R.

10

This is another instance where Petitioner claims Chief
Bench lied to or tried to deceive the court. Chief Bench had used
the line across the street to approve a permit for a T-shirt shop,
but did not want to depend on it for fire protection for the Indian
Village complex. The evidence before the court was that this shop
was quite small and would not have required the same amount of
water flow or pressure to combat a fire as would the Indian Village
complex, thus making it adequate for the fire protection of the Tshirt shop but inadequate for Indian Village. R. 00986-00987.
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00940-00941.

After taking all these things into consideration, and

based on the results of the November 1, 1991 test, the then Chief
Bench concluded that Indian Village's system was "not adequate for
safe firefighting capabilities.w

R. 00063.

Mr. Elder was provided only the number portion of the November
1, 1991 flow test results and was asked by Mayor Robert E. Ralston of
Springdale, to render an opinion on the adequacy of the system.

On

February 7, 1992, he wrote a letter to Mayor Ralston. In that letter
he stated, that based on the figures provided to him, that the code
requirements for fire flow had been met. R. 00823-00824. Petitioner
cites to this letter in support of its position that its fire
fighting system had met the code requirements.

See Brief of

Petitioner/Appellant at 35. However, it is important to look at the
reasons behind these statements and not merely examine them in a
vacuum.
When asked if the statements made in his letter to the mayor of
Springdale and the statements made by the then Chief Bench in his
December 10, 1991 letter were at odds, Mr. Elder responded as
follows:
No, I don't think so. Because what I was doing here was I was
responding to information that I had not seen prior to the
letter from Mayor Ralston, and I was responding strictly as a —
a response to the code, irrespective of — of any other
influencing factors. And this is — strictly according to the
code.•.
R. 00824.

In drafting this letter, Mr. Elder did not take into

consideration the nature of the fire fighting force in Springdale,
the manpower, the equipment or anything else that the city would have
but simply wrote the letter based on the information provided by
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Mayor Ralston and interpreting the information strictly according to
the code.

R. 00824-00825.

While he has the qualifications to

interpret the code, he does not have the qualifications to "secondguess the fire chief" in implementing the code. This is because the
fire chief:
has the ability to fight the fire. He knows his equipment, he
knows his manpower and knows all those relative factors there.
When I advise them, I — I advise them as to what the code says,
and — and I — I counsel with them on reasonableness. But —
but the fire chief has the — the final say on it.
R. 00825.
Despite the findings in his letter that based strictly on the
numbers, Indian Village's system met the appendix guidelines, Mr.
Elder

testified

that

the

fire

chief

has

the

discretion

in

implementing the code and determining what is safe and adequate for
a particular community.

He further stated that in light of this

discretion, the findings and recommendations in then Chief Bench's
December 10, 1991 letter did not violate any provision of the UFC nor
did they violate any of the guidelines in Appendix III-A of the UFC.
R. 00858.
iii. Appeals Boards.
As a result of the findings of the July 12, 1991 test that there
was insufficient water flow to hydrant three, Indian Village appealed
to the Fire Protection Board of Appeals. R. 00692.

This board was

composed of neutral, disinterested members of the community, as
opposed to members of the Fire Protection District.
One of the issues addressed was whether there was adequate water
flow out of hydrant number three to "bump the pitot gauge."

The

pitot is a device used to measure water pressure from a free flowing
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hydrant.

The units of measure start at five and increase in single

increments upwards to 200. R. 00952.
Before the board, the then Chief Bench testified that he
couldn't get a reading on hydrant number three.

R. 00692.

At the

time of the July 12, 1991 test, the then Chief Bench said in regards
to the test, tf[i]t really did not move it one increment, but we gave
[it] the benefit of the doubt."

R. 00693.

After examining all the

evidence presented, the board chose to uphold the then Chief Bench's
findings*
After Mr. West received the results of the November 1, 1991 test
he appealed for a second time to a Special Board of Appeals.
hearing was held on January 30, 1992.

A

Again the then Chief Bench

testified that on all tests conducted on hydrant number three, there
was not enough water pressure to move the Pitot gauge.

R. 00710-

00712.
Before the Fifth District Court, Al Bench was challenged on this
issue on cross-examination.

When he conducted each test on hydrant

three, he recorded a six, which would seem to indicate at least
enough pressure to move the gauge one increment.

The then Chief

Bench testified that on each test the gauge did not quite get to the
first increment, meaning a six, but on each test, he gave the hydrant
the benefit of the doubt and recorded that the hydrant had registered
a six. R. 00708, 00709. "And relatively speaking, six on a scale of
200 is not bumping the gauge.

It was a figurative form of speech

that I was using to say how insignificant it was.

Which I've said

throughout the process, that there's insignificant flow..."

R.

00952-00953. Al Bench explained further that when he appeared before
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the Appeals Boards, "the board members had all the information and
numbers in front of them.
as I remember it.
disguise it."

And I gave that same information verbally,

So it wasn't as if I was trying to hide it or

R. 00953.

Contrary to the Petitionees assertions

that Al Bench is lying, all data related to pitot gauge readings and
flow test results were provided every appeals board and, in fact, the
water flow did not, or at best barely bumped the pitot gauge.

The

January 30, 1992 board upheld the discretion and findings of then
Chief Bench.

R. 00132
iv.

Solutions offered by then Chief Bench in his
December 10, 1991 letter to Petitioner to make
its system safe.

As of mid-July 1990, Mr. West was aware of alternatives that had
been suggested to make his system safe.
Bench's

December

10,

1991

letter,

he

supra.

In then Chief

incorporated

discussed alternatives and added another option.

the

already

Specifically, the

then Chief Bench suggested:

1)

Loop the system.

2)

Sprinkle the building.

3)

Increase the size of the six inch line sufficiently to
provide 1000 GPM to each hydrant with the #1 hydrant
flowing.

4)

Install a hydrant at the mark designated by the District in
front of the Laundromat and remove the #3 hydrant.

R. 00770-00771, 00063.

While the option to increase the size of the

pipe to allow for 1,000 GPM was a new alternative, it was never an
absolute

requirement,

contrary

to

Petitioner/Appellant's Brief at 15.
single option was ever required.

Petitioners

claims.

These were options.

See
No one

At no time did then Chief Bench
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ever require one over the other.

Mr. Tandy testified that he

believed that these alternatives were a good way to address Indian
Village's concerns and that offering such options were very much
within then Chief Bench's discretion.

R. 00890.

When Mr. West appeared before the January 30, 1992 Board, he
agreed to remove one of his hydrants and move the hydrant that was
under the power line. That is, Mr. West agreed to option number 4.
R. 00995-00996.

However, he failed to do this.

Later, Mr. West

decided that rather than remove the hydrant, he would install an
eight-inch line, thereby increasing the pressure.

R. 00992-00993.

By this time, however, the January, 1992 Board of Appeals had grown
weary of Petitioner's delays and refusal to comply, had modified the
alternatives in then Chief Bench's December 10, 1991 letter and would
not allow Mr. West to install the eight-inch line, but rather
required that he comply with his original agreement to remove the
hydrant.

R. 00993-00998.

Therefore, contrary to Petitioner's

assertions that then Chief Bench refused to allow Mr. West to comply
with one of the alternatives suggested in his letter, it was the
Board of Appeals who refused to allow Mr. West to proceed as he
wanted and insisted that he proceed as he had agreed.

R. 00992-

00993.
v.

Two hydrants on a six-inch, dead-end line
created a fire hazard to fire fighters and if
used simultaneously, would not provide adequate
protection.

The state Fire Marshall's office does not allow two hydrants to
be placed on a six-inch dead-end line.

This is because of the

possibility of not having enough water to pump from one hydrant while
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water is being drawn or drafted from the other hydrant.

R. 00814.

This is the reason that Mr. Elder required that Indian Village,s
system be tested.

Supra.

This was one of the factors that then

Chief Bench used in determining that the system was inadequate.
Supra.

Despite the fact that Mr. West did install hydrant number

one, hydrants number two and three still remained on the dead-end,
six-inch line and based on the results of the water flow tests, then
Chief Bench concluded that the system was not adequate for safe
firefighting.

R. 00063. This conclusion was also supported by Mr.

Elder, supra.

R. 00824.

Petitioner
protection.
R. 00548.

called

John M. Mertens

as

an

expert

in fire

Mr. Mertens is a fire protection and safety engineer.
He teaches courses on the hydraulic design of water

supplies, water flow testing and friction loss. R. 00549-00551. Mr.
Mertens, however, is not a fire fighter.
studied

R. 00591.

While he has

what firemen do, he does not consider himself a tactics

expert nor has he ever fought a fire. R. 00592.

He testified that

based on the numbers in then Chief Bench's December 10, 1991 letter
that Indian Village's system would be safe.

R. 00566-00567.

Mr. Elder similar conclusions, made in a vacuum, supra,

Like

Mr. Mertens

did not take into consideration the any of the factors that a fire
chief should take into consideration in determining whether a system
was adequate or even those taken into account here by Al Bench.
While agreeing that the fire chief has discretion in implementing the
code, Mr. Mertens does not believe that the type of equipment
available to a unit or their level of training play any role in
determining the safety of a water delivery system.
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R. 00593-00595.

He also testified that based on the numbers represented by then Chief
Bench's letter, that a fire department should be able to adequately
fight a

,f

normal" fire,

R. 00576.

Later, during the course of the hearing, the Court heard
evidence from Charles B. Tandy, of the Provo City Fire Department,
Mr, Tandy has been with the Provo City fire department since 1979.
Mr. Tandy is currently a battalion chief.

As battalion chief, Mr.

Tandy oversees four fire stations and 24 crew.

He oversees all

operations of the fire department when he's on duty.

R. 00867. As

a battalion chief, he is also an incident commander. This means that
he orchestrates fire suppression tactics.
been certified in the fire code.
Mr. Tandy served
department

R. 00867.

He has also

R. 00866.

for five years as an inspector

fire prevention bureau.

R. 00868.

for the

Part of those

responsibilities included conducting flow tests and he has conducted
a large number of such tests.

R. 00868, 00869.

Mr. Tandy had an

opportunity to review a number of pieces of evidence in preparation
to testify.

He reviewed then Chief Bench's December 10, 1991 letter

as well as listened to the testimony of Al Bench, Mr. Mertens, Mr.
West and Mr. Elder. R. 00869, 00870. Based on all this information,
Mr Tandy testified that the method used by then Chief Bench in
conducting the November 1, 1991 flow test was appropriate and that he
would have conducted the test the same way.

R. 00872.

Mr. Tandy

also used then Chief Bench's test results and calculated the numbers
in longhand, and came within two gallons per minute of the results
reached by then Chief Bench. R. 00873. Mr. Tandy then expressed his
opinion that the results reached and conclusions stated in then Chief
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Bench/s letter were correct.

R. 00874.

The key to reaching his

conclusion was based on the fact that hydrants two and three are on
a dead-end, six-inch line which wouldn't produce enough flow if a
fire department were pumping off those two hydrants. R. 00874. Mr.
Tandy then explained to the Court the dangers that such a system
would present.
Upon arrival at a scene, the chief officer would determine, by
quick calculations, what the fire flow would need to be to extinguish
the fire. R. 00875.

If there were a fire at Indian Village and an

engine were to hook up to hydrant number three, and "you're not
advancing your attack lines, you can easily be pumping at capacity."
R. 00876.

If a second engine arrived and hooked up to number two,

that is where the danger lies.

R. 00876.

If you have fire fighters attacking a structure on the inside —
say we have our fire fighters working off of engine number one,
and they have charged attack lines, and they're doing an
interior attack, which means they're inside the building working
to extinguish the fire, which is the proper and the easiest way
to attack a structure fire, they're using that water as a
sprinkler and as a protective curtain for themselves.
A fire inside a building will generate heat in the neighborhood
of 900 to 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit.
Fire fighters wear
protective clothing, which is not a fireproof material, it's a
fire retardant material. So it will burn. And fire fighters
can't handle 900 degrees of temperature. We.'re not equipped to
work, in that kind of a heat. So you use a fog pattern — a
water shield to protect them from the heat that's being
generated by the combustion inside.
If an engine that was hooked to hydrant number two was pulling
water in excess of the thousand gallons a minute, that would
cause engine — the hydrant at — correction — the engine at
hydrant number three to be starved for water in that he wouldn't
have enough water to supply the demand needed by the attack
lines.
And that's where the — the danger of this come
in...that you can starve your engine...
R. 00876-00877.
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Mr. Tandy then went on to explain another dangerous scenario
presented by the Indian Village water supply system.

Not only will

a crew attack the fire on the inside of a building, but a crew will
also attempt to protect surrounding buildings.

Due to the extreme

heat, if a "curtain of water" is not set up between the burning
buildings

and

the

surrounding

buildings,

those

other

exposed

buildings run the risk of catching fire. R. 00879.
If the crew pumping from hydrant three were putting up this
curtain of water, and a second engine began pumping from hydrant
number two, it is conceivable that the second engine could take all
the water in the system and leave number three without a water
supply, thus exposing surrounding structures to the radiant heat. R.
00878-00879.
If there were to be a fire at the Indian Village structure,
based on the size of the building, Mr. Tandy stated that there would
need to be a minimum of three engine companies. R. 00880. This then
brought up a further safety question.

Because Springdale would be

unable to handle a blaze at the Indian Village site, only having two
engines, they would need to enlist the aid of neighboring agencies.
The problem lies in the level of training each department has as well
as communication between the departments.

Should the Springdale

engines be pumping from hydrants one and three and another company
comes in and begins pumping from number two, the situations described
supra could occur due to a lack of communication between engineers.
R. 00881-00882.

39

Another factor Mr. Tandy described is that there is never a
"normal" fire, contrary to Mr. Mertens assertions11.

There are so

many different factors that affect a fire; the location, construction
of a structure, occupancy

of the structure, even the weather

conditions. R. 00883. Therefore, there is never a "normal" fire and
as such, a department must always train and plan for the worst
situation possible.

R. 00883.

In this case, a worst case scenario

would assume that the motel is full, it's late at night, there are
people sleeping and others working, and you have an involved or fully
involved situation, R. 00884, requiring three engines and their
departments. R.

00880.

Assuming

such a situation, Mr. Tandy

concluded that then Chief Bench's conclusions were reasonably based
on the Uniform Fire Code. R. 00887.
vi.

Cavitation and collapse of the system.

Al Bench testified that if a system is operated at less than 20
PSI, there could be a danger of cavitation of a pumper truck or
collapsing the system, R. 00529, and this was just one of many
factors he considered.

supra,

R. 00938.

Collapse refers to the

collapse of the pipes due to too much suction and not enough water
available to go through the pipes

R. 00529.

Cavitation deals with

the pump on the engine. The pump must have a minimum pressure coming
into it in order to prevent a phenomenon where the water would turn
to steam, thus causing the pump packing, the seams and the pump to

11

Mr. Mertens testified that a normal fire at the Indian
Village complex might involve a single room or possibly a second.
R. 00576-00577. Therefore, based on that "normal" fire situation,
a fire company would not be using more than 500 gallons per minute.
R. 00579.
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blow apart.

R. 00892.

To prevent this, a trained engineer must

control the minimum inlet pressure by monitoring the appropriate
gauge.

R. 00569.

The town of Springdale, however, is faced with the problem of
old equipment and untrained personnel. R. 00938-00939, 00949. While
the experts agree that the way to prevent collapse and cavitation is
to have a trained engineer monitor the water pressure gauge on the
engine, Springdale does not have this luxury.

R. 00949.

They must

make do with what they have, an unreliable gauge and a volunteer fire
department.

While Petitioner argues that this is dangerous, it is

the only system that was available to then Chief Bench. See Brief of
Petitioner/Appellant at 20. Because 20 PSI is an accepted figure, R.
00569-00570, and the then Chief Bench, in light of his equipment and
personnel, knew of no other way

to ensure that

collapse and

cavitation would not occur, other than to require 20 PSI, was
justified in making the decision he did.
Petitioner states that 20 PSI is not a code requirement.
Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 20.

See

However, Petitioner's own

expert, Mr. Mertens states that 20 PSI is a requirement.

While the

code may not discuss it directly, it is a requirement.

R. 00569-

00570. "I don't recall that the 1988 version has 20 PSI in it. It's
a normally accepted figure, regardless of whether it's in there...But
20 pounds, to me, would be the acceptable figure."

R. 00638.

Mr. Mertens testified to a great number of facts and details as
to when a system would collapse or cavitate.

If, as Mr. Mertens

testified, that 20 PSI is a normally accepted figure, regardless of
the actual physics of when a system collapses or cavitates, then
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Chief Bench was justified in relying on the "normally accepted
figure."

Even if then Chief Bench was wrong in his belief that a

system would collapse or cavitate at 20 PSI, it was only one factor
he used in making his decision.

R. 00938.

As Mr. Tandy testified,

cavitation was a problem, but the real problem was that there were
two hydrants on a dead-end, six-inch line. R. 00891.
C.

PETITIONER FAILS TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD FRAUD, NOR IS IT A
REQUIRED ELEMENT IN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ANALYSIS.

Petitioner also asserts that Al Bench acted fraudulently, thus
abusing his discretion. While in its Memorandum Decision, the Fifth
District Court refers to the fact that Petitioner failed to show that
then Chief Bench's decision was based on "fraud," unlike other state
courts, Utah Courts have not adopted this as a basis for review.
Petitioner cites to a New Mexico case, Chavez

v. Sandia

Corp.,

555

P.2d 699 (N.M. 1976) for the proposition that a court may review an
administrative decision to see whether the decision was made in "bad
faith."

Petitioner then cites to Black's law dictionary for the

definition of fraud. Petitioner then simply jumps to the conclusion
that bad faith equals fraud.

See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, at

37.
To establish a case of fraud, a strict list of elements must be
proven:

(1) that a representation was made;

(2) concerning a

presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
presenter either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
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ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Fin.

Co. v. Anderson,

Sugarhouse

610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980).

While Petitioner asserts that Al Bench acted fraudulently, that
is all they are, assertions.

Petitioner has failed to meet the

elements required to prove fraud.

Petitioner argues that Al Bench

lied to the Court. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 38, 39, 43.
Petitioner, however, had ample opportunity to present evidence as
well as cross-examine Al Bench regarding these alleged lies.

The

Court had the opportunity to hear all the evidence, including Al
Bench's testimony and cross-examination, and still determined that
these allegations of fraud and lies were, at worst, nothing more than
n

misstatements.M R. 00138.
D.

THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THEN CHIEF BENCH AND THE LOWER
COURT SUPPORT BOTH THEIR FINDINGS,

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found that the then
Fire Chief relied on credible supporting evidence in making his
determination that Indian Village Trading Post's "two fire hydrants
on the dead-end six-inch line created a fire fighting problem."
00137.

R.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that it was

convinced by the testimony of both Mr. Tandy and Mr. Elder.
00136-37.

R.

In it's Memorandum Decision, the Court pointed to several

factors in reaching it's decision.

The Court noted that "[i]t is

clear from the provisions of the Uniform Fire Code that the fire
chief

has

broad

discretion"

in

establishing,

regulating

and

maintaining a fire protection system, including ensuring there is
adequate water supply at the site to fight fires.
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R. 00135. While

the results from the water flow test show that the hydrants produced
over 2,750 GPM, then Chief Bench determined that the distribution
system was inadequate for safe fire fighting.

R. 00136.

Despite

Petitionees assertions that once this water flow had been met, the
requirements of the UFC had been met, such is not the law.

The UFC

does not contain any such limitation, but instead allows the fire
chief to cure any dangerous situations on the property.
The Court continued, stating that

R. 00136.

(1) the Petitioner had

installed the fire hydrants without then Chief Bench's permission;
(2) that the installation of two hydrants on a dead-end six-inch
water line created a hazard to those who might fight a fire at the
Indian

Village

complex;

(3)

that

the

hydrants,

if

used

simultaneously, would not provide the needed flow to protect the
building or those fighting the fire; (4) that then Chief Bench
provided to Petitioner four possible solutions; (5) and that the
problem was not the amount of water available, but the inadequate
design of the delivery system.
The lower Court judge had the opportunity to listen to the
witnesses, assess their credibility

and evaluate

the evidence.

Petitioner has failed to show that the lower Court's findings are
against the clear weight of the evidence, Cal Wadsworth,
1378, and as such are clearly erroneous.

Gillmor,

898 P.2d at

904 P. 2d at 706.

Finally, w[b]ecause Petitioner is merely realleging his version of
the facts, this is insufficient to challenge the court's findings or
conclusions."

BluJbaugrh, 904 P.2d at 699.
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E.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN PIECES OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
1.

Standard employed by the courts in determining the
admissibility of evidence.

A trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to
admit or exclude expert evidence and his decision is to be upheld
unless "manifestly erroneous.11 Salem v. U.S. Lines, Co.,
(1962).

370 U.S. 31

Also, a reviewing court will not overturn a trial court's

decision regarding the admissibility of evidence unless there has
been an abuse of discretion.
State

v.

White,

Appeals in White

Blubaugh,

904 P.2d at 699, citing to

880 P.2d 18 (Utah App. 1994).

The Utah Court of

stated:

When reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding admissibility of
evidence under Rule 403, we will not overturn the court's
determination unless it was an abuse of discretion. The Utah
Supreme Court has noted that the term abuse of discretion is not
capable of precise definition. Instead a spectrum of discretion
exists. .. [and] toward the broad end of the spectrum is the
decision to admit or exclude evidence under Utah Rule of
Evidence 403. The trial court has considerable freedom in
applying [Rule 403] to the facts, freedom to make decisions
which appellate judges might not make themselves ab initio but
will not reverse. Therefore, we will only conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion if the ruling in favor of
admissibility was beyond the limits of reasonability. Finally,
even if we conclude that the trial court's decision regarding
admissibility was in error, we will only reverse if the error
was harmful...
White,

880 P.2d at 21 (citations omitted), (quotations omitted).
While the Utah Supreme Court addressed the definition of "abuse

of discretion" in regards to admissibility of evidence, it follows a
fortiori

that the same standards apply when a trial court rules

evidence inadmissible.

Id.

Therefore, in this case, the lower

Court's ruling to exclude certain pieces of evidence should be
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overturned only upon a showing that the ruling was an abuse of
discretion or "beyond the limits of reasonability."

Id.

Utah Courts further state that a reversal of the trial court's
determination of the admissibility of proffered evidence will take
place only where there was an abuse of discretion that affected the
party's "substantial rights." Hardy,

776 P.2d at 924. An abuse of

discretion affecting a party's substantial rights occurs, if viewing
the evidence as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that a
different result would have been reached, Erickson
Inc.,

v. Wasatch

Manor,

802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990).
Finally, when a trial is before the court alone, the court's

rulings on evidence need not be subjected to as critical an inquiry
because in arriving at it's conclusions, the court will include in
it's consideration, the judge's knowledge and judgment as to the
materiality of the evidence as well as it's competency and effect.
Hardy,

776 P.2d at 925.
2.

Evidence excluded by the Court,
i.

Rick Rosenberg.

Indian Village attempted to introduce the testimony of Rick
Rosenberg as an expert witness on computer simulations of water
systems and that he was prepared to testify regarding computer
simulations of Springdale's system. R. 00734. Petitioner proffered
the following reasons why the testimony was relevant:

(1) the

computer simulation would have shown that the back two hydrants, with
hydrant number one closed, could produce close to 900 GPM, if not
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more12, R. 00735-00736; (2) that the test would show that hydrant
number three was not dangerous and that the residual PSI would be
greater

than

20

PSI, R.

00738-00739;

(3) that

under

various

scenarios, there would be adequate water flow to the hydrants, R.
00739-00740; and finally in a desperate attempt to get the testimony
admitted, (4) that the test would show that there was more than 1,100
gallons for hydrants two and three and that then Chief Bench was
wrong.

R. 00741.

For each proffer made, the Court had to remind Petitioner that
the issue was not what a test conducted after the fact or what
various scenarios would show, but what information was available to
then Chief Bench on November 1, 1991.

Even if then Chief Bench had

been wrong in his determination, the Court stated: "It may be.

But

the issue here is not whether he was wrong, but what the test showed.
And the only test we can rely on is the test he had before him at the
time.

So it would appear to me that this information would be

irrelevant, and the objection should be sustained."

R. 00741.

In its brief, Petitioner asserts for the first time that Mr.
Rosenberg's testimony was offered to show that then Chief Bench had
falsified the results of the November 1, 1991 test.

See Brief of

Petitioner/Appellant at 44. Upon review of the record, however, it
is clear that this proffer was never made.

Petitioner now asserts

that Mr. Rosenberg's testimony would have established an element of
fraud on then Chief Bench's part. As previously discussed, however,
mere assertions do not meet the requirements of fraud.
12

Moreover,

This information was already before the court through the
testimony of Mr. Mertens. R. 00561, 00566.
47

virtually all the witnesses who testified, including Petitioner's
expert, Mr. Mertens, testified that the numbers and calculations in
Al Bench's December flow test report were correct.

R. 00566-00567,

00817, 00874. Petitioner's assertions that the results have in some
way been falsified are directly contrary to the evidence presented to
the Court.
Further, in his testimony, Mr. Mertens testified that he had
seen the results from Mr. Rosenberg's simulation, that such tests
showed that it might be possible to get 1,500 GPM from hydrant three
and that based on these numbers and tests, the system was safe. R.
00566-00568.

Even though Mr. Rosenberg himself did not testify to

the results of the computer simulation, that information was before
the Court.

Mr. Rosenberg's testimony would have been duplicative.

As Mr. Rosenberg's reports and the data contained were before the
Court below, notwithstanding the Court's exclusion of Mr. Rosenberg,
the Petitioner cannot argue that a different result would obtain had
Mr. Rosenberg testified.

Hence, no substantial right has been

affected in the Court's exclusion.
ii.

Hardy at 924.

Exclusion of reference to statements made at Fire
Board meeting.

Petitioner next asserts that had it been able to cross-examine
then Chief Bench regarding some comments that were allegedly made at
a fire board meeting, that a different result would have been likely.
See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 48-49.

There is nothing to

support this contention.
Had evidence been admitted that a discussion regarding the
minimum flow for the back two hydrants had taken place at the March
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1991 Fire Board Meeting, such evidence would still not be relevant.
Even giving

Petitioner

the benefit of the doubt that such a

discussion took place, such a discussion, months earlier, had no
bearing on the test administered and evidence gathered on November 1,
1991 or the conclusions reached as stated in the December 10, 1991
letter.

As the Court below correctly stated, the issue before the

Court was what the test showed on November 1, 1991, R. 00741, not
what may or may not have been said at a prior Fire Board Hearing.
F«

THIS COURT SHOULD IGNORE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER FOR
REVIEW IN ITS AMENDED DOCKETING STATEMENT THAT ARE NOT
ADDRESSED IN ITS ARGUMENT.

In Petitioner's Amended Docketing Statement, Petitioner raised
the following issues that were not addressed in his Brief to the
Court.
4. b. Did the trial Court error by excluding an audio tape from
a Fire Board meeting held on March 6, 1991, that would have
established that 555 g.p.m. was the minimum water flow from
hydrant #3...
4. c. Did the trial Court error by limiting the parties to two
hours for the Respondent to give his direct testimony, for the
Petitioner to cross examine the Respondent, for Petitioner to
present rebuttal witnesses, and time for both parties to make
their closing arguments.
This time limitation resulted in
Petitioner having to chose between using his last seven and one
half minutes to present rebuttal witnesses or make his closing
argument. Wayne Houston, Fire Chief of St. George, and Brent
Gardner, Springdale's water engineer, were sitting in the Court
ready to testify for Petitioner...
See Petitioner's Amended Docketing Statement at 6-8.
The specific issue addressed by Petitioner in its brief in
regards to issue "b" was whether the Court was correct in sustaining
an objection to a question asked Al Bench whether he had ever agreed
that a minimum flow needed for the back two hydrants would be 550
GPM, not that the Court erred in excluding the tape.
49

Petitioner

stated that it had been furnished a copy of a tape from a Fire Board
Meeting. See Brief of Petitioner/Appellant at 48. This is the only
mention of a tape in Petitioner's Brief.
that

the Court

erred

by

excluding

Petitioner did not argue

the tape.

While

a minor

distinction, Petitioner failed to address the specific issue of the
tape's admissibility.

Petitioner completely fails to address issue

•M.c." in its brief.
It is well settled that a court need not address issues that a
party has not briefed. Maack v. Resource
875 P.2d 570, n. 3 (Utah App. 1994).

Design & Construction,

Inc,

Moreover, Petitioner cannot

cure this problem by arguing it in its reply since an appellate court
"will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief"
as this prevents the nonmoving party the opportunity to respond.
State

v. Phathammavong,

860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993).

Therefore,

this Court should not allow argument or consider the issues raised in
paragraphs 4.b. and 4.c. of Petitioner's Amended Docketing Statement.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Respondent respectfully requests that
this Court find that the Fifth District Court erred in denying
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and enter an order of dismissal; or,
alternatively, affirm the Fifth District Court's ruling that Al Bench
as the then Fire Chief did not in any way abuse his discretion.
DATED this

^J

day of May, 1996.

C

^ ^ S T I R B A &\^!PHAWAY
By:

50

\
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR.
Attorneys for
Respondent/Appellee
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THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. WEST: The Court on March 9, 1995, directed
me to do exactly what I have done.

In fact, on the 19th of

March, 10 days after the Court directed me to do so, I
filed this petition.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WEST: We do come under —
litigated this before.
both —
party."

in fact, we have

Did I have a right for a 65B. And

everybody agreed that I did.

"You got the wrong

So I don't know if you want to go into —

whether we have a standing under the rule.

into

I don't think

there's any question that we do under all three paragraphs,
A, B, and C.
Now, I don't know if you want me to direct
ourselves to you.
THE COURT:

I'm not going to preclude it, but

I've read your memorandum, and I've indicated what I think
the issue is. Which is mootness.
MR. WEST: Okay.

Okay, Your Honor.

Number one, Your Honor, we have never —

under

this petition, we are not objecting to any red tags.

Which

they have tried to say that we are objecting and want you
to take facts on those red tags, Your Honor.

We are not —

we're not objecting to any of the facts underlying the
water flow test. We accept the water flow test that he has

8
stated in certain letters. There is no factual argument.
Our argument, Your Honor —

it's his determination as a

fire chief that they're not in compliance.
Now, Your Honor, the —
THE COURT:

the respondent here —

Let me interrupt you, if I can,

right there.
MR. WEST: Okay.
THE COURT: And I don't want —

I don't mean to

interrupt your train of thought.
MR. WEST: Just get to where it's bothering you,
Your Honor# and —
THE COURT:

I just have a guestion that occurred

to me.
MR. WEST: Okay.
THE COURT: What do you view as the Court's
position —

if we were to hold this hearing, would you want

the Court to review all the evidence and see whether he
decided the issue correctly?
MR. WEST: No, sir. No, sir.
THE COURT: What do you view as the standard

—

the burden of the Court?
MR. WEST: The Uniform Fire Code leaves it to
the discretion of the fire chief to determine whether

—

whether the water flow meets the compliance with the code.
So it's very simple, actually.

It's less than a half day

9
hearing.
The test.

In fact# all we'd have to have is the letters.
We're not questioning any of the facts, and

whether that complies. Now, it's real simple, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What do you mean whether it
complies?
MR. WEST: Well, there's Table A —

A and B in

the Uniform Fire Code that states how many gallons per
minute the fire system was required.

It happened to be

2,750 gallons a minute out of a number of the minimum of
three fire hydrants. He took three tests, giving the
readings of —

of each fire hydrant with a total gallons

per minute.
Now, we say —
Honor.

and it's real simple, Your

We say we meet the requirements of the tables of

the Uniform Fire Code as to water flow capacity or
requirement.

The minimum.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. WEST: We are — we —
were suing —

we are asking —

it's not really a suit.

We're —

we're

petitioning the respondent, which was the fire chief —
determination —
quibble over.

we

his

the tests he made. Which there's no

We don't want to go into the facts, or how

he made mistakes. We're accepting everything, Your Honor.
We say what he said the results do.
Uniform Fire Code.

We do comply with the

It's really not that —

that technical.

TabB

2.101-2.104

UNIFORM FIRE CODE

ARTICLE 2
ORGANIZATION, AUTHORITY, DUTIES
AND PROCEDURES
Division I
ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY

I

|
|
|
|

Responsibility for Enforcement
Sec. 2.101. The chief shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of this code. Under his direction, the fire department shall enforce all
ordinances of the jurisdiction pertaining to:
1. The prevention of fires.
2. The suppression or extinguishing of dangerous or hazardous fires.
3. The storage, use and handling of explosive, flammable, combustible, toxic,
corrosive and other hazardous gaseous, solid and liquid materials.
4. The installation and maintenance of automatic, manual and other private fire
alarm systems and fire-extinguishing equipment.
5. The maintenance and regulation of fire escapes.
6. The maintenance of fire protection and the elimination of fire hazards on
land and in buildings, structures and other property, including those under construction.
7. The maintenance of exits.
8. The investigation of the cause, origin and circumstances of fire.
Rules and Regulations
Sec. 2.102. The chief, with the approval of the administrator, is authorized to
make and enforce such rules and regulations for the prevention and control of fires
and fire hazards as may be necessary from time to time to carry out the intent of
this code. A minimum of one certified copy or the number required by governing
law of such rules and regulations shall be filed with the clerk of the jurisdiction
and shall be in effect immediately thereafter and additional copies shall be kept in
the office of the fire department for distribution to the public.
Fire Prevention Bureau
Sec. 2.103. A fire prevention bureau is established within the fire department
under the direction of the fire chief, which shall consist of such fire department
personnel as may be assigned thereto by the fire chief. The function of this bureau
shall be to assist the fire chief in the administration and enforcement of the fire
prevention provisions of this code.
Fire Prevention Engineer or Fire Marshal
Sec. 2.104. The chief may designate a member of the fire department to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of fire prevention engineer as set forth
in this code. He may also be known as fire marshal.
2
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9.103-9.104

ALTER AND ALTERATION is any change, addition or modification in
construction or occupancy.
APARTMENT HOUSE is any building, or portion thereof, which contains
three or more dwelling units and, for the purposes of the code, includes residential
condominiums.
APPROVED refers to approval by the chief as the result of investigation and
tests conducted by him or by reason of accepted principles or tests by national
authorities, technical or scientific organizations.
AREA shall mean a particular extent of surface. (Also sec Floor Area.)
ASPHALT KETTLE is any vessel or container used to process, heat, hold for
heating or dispense flammable or combustible roofing materials that arc in liquid
form or will take that form as a result of being exposed to such vessel or container.
ASSEMBLY is the gathering together of 50 or more persons for such purposes
as deliberation, education, instruction, worship, entertainment, amusement,
drinking, dining or awaiting transportation.
ATMOSPHERIC TANK is a storage tank which has been designed to operate
at pressures from atmospheric through 0.5 psig.
ATRIUM is an opening through two or more floor levels other than enclosed
stairways, elevators, hoistways, escalators, plumbing, electrical, airconditioning or other equipment, which is closed at the top and not defined as a
mall. Floor levels as used in this definition do not include balconies withing an
assembly occupancy or mezzanines which comply with the Building Code requirements for mezzanines.

|
B

I
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AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM SYSTEM is a system which automatically
detects a fire condition and actuates a fire alarm signal device.
AUTOMATIC FIRE CHECK is a device listed for installation in communicating piping carrying an explosive vapor/air mixture to prevent a flashback from
reaching the underground tanks or equipment in the piping system. These devices
shall be equipped with special elements for arresting the explosion wave which
may be already established in a pipe. These devices shall contain an automatically
operated shutoff valve to stop flow of vapor/air mixture in event of a flashback and
continued burning at the arrester element. The shutoff valve shall be capable of a
manual reset.
AUTOMATIC FIRE-EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM is an approved system
of devices and equipment which automatically detects a fire and discharges an
approved fire-extinguishing agent onto or in the area of a fire.

|
B
|

B
Sec. 9.104. BALCONY, EXTERIOR EXIT, is a landing or porch projecting
from the wall of a building and which serves as an exit. The long side shall be at
least 50 percent open, and the open area above the guardrail shall be so distributed
as to prevent the accumulation of smoke or toxic gases.
BARREL shall mean a volume of 42 U.S. gallons.
21
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10.207-10.301

(i) Bridges. When a bridge is required to be used as access under this section, it
shall be constructed and maintained in accordance with the applicable sections of
the Building Code and using designed live loading sufficient to carry the imposed
loads of fire apparatus.
(j) Grade. The gradient for a fire apparatus access road shall not exceed the
maximum approved by the chief.
0c) Obstruction. The required width of any fire apparatus access road shall not
be obstructed in any manner, including parking of vehicles. Minimum required
widths and clearances established under this section shall be maintained at all
times.
(I) Signs. When required, approved signs or other approved notices shall be
provided and maintained for fire apparatus access roads to identify such roads and
prohibit the obstruction thereof or both.
Premises Identification
Sec 10.208. (a) General. Approved numbers or addresses shall be placed on
all new and existing buildings in such a position as to be plainly visible and legible
from the street or roadfrontingthe property. Said numbers shall contrast with their
background.
(b) Street or Road Signs. When required by the chief, a street or road shall be f
identified with approved signs.
|
Key Box
See. 10.209. When access to or within a structure or an area is unduly difficult
because of secured openings or where immediate access is necessary for lifesaving or fire-fighting purposes, the chief may require a key box to be installed in
an accessible location. The key box shall be a type approved by the chief and shall
contain keys to gain necessary access as required by the chief.

Division til
INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF FIREPROTECTION, LIFE-SAFETY SYSTEMS AND
APPLIANCES
Installation
* Sec 10301. (a) Type Required. The chief shall designate the type and number
of fire appliances to be installed and maintained in and upon all buildings and
premises in the jurisdiction other than private dwellings. This shall be done
according to the relative severity of probable fire, including the rapidity with
which it may spread. Such appliances shall be of a type suitable for the probable
class offireassociated with such building or premises and shall have approval of
the chief.
(b) Special Hazards. In occupancies of an especially hazardous nature or
where special hazards exist in addition to the normal hazard of the occupancy, or
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10.301-10.302

UNIFORM FIRE CODE

where access for fire apparatus is unduly difficult, additional safeguards may be
required consisting of additional fire appliance units, more than one type of
appliance, or special systems suitable for the protection of the hazard involved.
Such devices or appliances may consist of automatic fire alarm systems, automatic sprinkler or water spray systems, standpipe and hose, fixed or portable fire
extinguishers, suitable asbestos blankets, breathing apparatus, manual or automatic covers, carbon dioxide, foam, halogenated and dry chemical or other
special fire-extinguishing systems. Where such systems are installed, they shall
be in accordance with the applicable Uniform Fire Code Standards or standards of
the National Fire Protection Association when Uniform Fire Code Standards do
not apply.
f
|
|
|
I
|
|

(c) Water Supply. An approved water supply capable of supplying the required
fire flow for fire protection shall be provided to all premises upon which buildings
or portions of buildings are hereafter constructed. When any portion of ihe
building protected is in excess of 150 feet from a water supply on a public street, as
measured by an approved route around the exterior of the building/there shall be
provided, when required by the chief, on-site fire hydrants and mains capable of
supplying the required fire flow.

i

|
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Water supply may consist of reservoirs, pressure tanks, elevated tanks, w^ u
mains or other fixed systems capable of providing the required fire flow/In setting
the requirements for fire flow, the chief may be guided by the provision in
Appendix HI-A of this code.
>The location, number and type of fire hydrants connected to a water supply
capable of delivering the required fire flow shall be provided on the public street
or on the site of the premises to be protected as required and approved by the chiefV
All hydrants shall be accessible to the fire department apparatus by roadways
meeting the requirements of Section 10.207.
(d) Fire Hydrant Markers. When required by the chief, hydrant locations
shall be identified by the installation of reflective markers.
y
(c) Timing of Installation. When fire protection facilities are to be installed by
the developer, such facilities including all surface access roads shall be installed
and made serviceable prior to and during the time of construction. When alternate
methods of protection, as approved by the chief, are provided, the above may be
modified or waived. «
" *
(0 Approval and Testing. All fire alarm systems, fire hydrant systems, fireextinguishing systems (including automatic sprinklers), wet and dry standpipes,
basement inlet pipes, and other fire-protection systems and appurtenances thereto
shall meet the approval of the fire department as to installation and location and
shall be subject to such periodic tests as required by the chief. Plans and specifications shall be submitted to the fire department for review and approval prior to
construction.

Maintenance
Sec. 10.302. (a) General. All sprinkler systems, fire hydrant systems, standpipe systems, fire alarm systems, portable fire extinguishers, smoke and heat
50
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Division III
FIRE PROTECTION
APPENDIX IH-A
FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS

f
I
1
|
|
|
|

1. SCOPE
This appendix is the procedure for determining fire-flow requirments for all
buildings or portions of buildings hereafter constructed. This appendix is not
intended to apply to structures other than buildings. The fire-flow requirement is
the quantity of water in gallons per minute needed to control an anticipated fire in
a building or group of buildings. The chief shall establish the minimum residual
pressure and the flow duration to be used when determining fire flow.

f
|
|
|
|
|
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2. DEFINITIONS
FIRE AREA is the total floor area in square feet for all floor levels within the
exterior walls, or under the horizontal projection of the roof of a building. Each
portion of a building separated by one or more four-hour area separation walls
with no openings and provided with a 30-inch parapet constructed in accordance
with the Building Code may be considered as separate fire areas for the purposes
of determining the required fire flow.

|
]
|
|
1
|
|

3. MODIFICATIONS
Fire-flow requirements may be modified downward for isolated buildings or
group of buildings in rural areas or small communities where the development of
full fire-flow requirements is impractical.
Fire flow may be modified upward where conditions indicate an unusual
susceptability to group fires or conflagrations. An upward modification shall not
be more than twice that required for the building under consideration.

|
|
|

4. FIRE-FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS
The minimum fire-flow requirements for one- and two-family dwellings shall
be 1000 gallons per minute.

§
1

EXCEPTION: Fire flow may be reduced 50 percent when the building is
provided with an approved automatic sprinkler system.

|
|

The fire flow for buildings other than one- and two-family dwellings shall be
not less than that specified in Table No. HI-A-A.

I
I
|

EXCEPTION: The required fire flow may be reduced up to 75 percent when the
building is provided with an approved automatic sprinkler system, but in no case less
than 1500 gallons per minute.

|
§

In Types I and U-F.R. construction, only the three largest successive floor areas
shall be used.
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TABLE NO. Ill-A-A
FIRE-FLOW GUIDE FOR BUILDINGS OTHER THAN
ONE- AND TWO-FAMILY DWELLINGS
FIRE
FLOW
(Gallons
|

CONSTRUCTION TYPE

Per

i

Minute)

ll-F.R.

II ONE-HR.
HI ONE-HR.

tV-H.T.
V-ONE-HR.

H-N
Hf-N

V-N

J

TOTAL FIRE AREA IN SQUARE FEET
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
2,500
2,750
3,000
3,250
3,500
3,750
4,000
4,250
4.500
4,750
5,000
5,250
5,500
5.750
6.000
6,250
6,500
6,750
7,000
7,250
7,500
7,750
8,000

12.700
22,700
30.200
17.000
38,700
2L800
48,300
24.200
59,000
33.200
70,900
39,700
47,100
83,700
54.900
97,700
63.400
112,700
128,700
72.400
82.100
145,900
164,200
92,400
183,400
103,100
203,700
114.600
225,200
126,700
139.400
247,700
152.600
271,200
295,900
166.500
UNLIMITED UNLIMITED

".
**
"
^
"

3,600
8.200
5,900
4,800
10,900
7,900
9,800
12,900
6,200 1
7,700
17,400
12,600
15,400
9,400
21,300
11.300
25,500
18.400
30,100
21,800
13,400 1
35,200
25,900
15,600
j
18,000
40,600
29,300
46,400
20,600
33,500
23,300
|
52,500
37,900
42,700
26,300
|
59,100
47.700
29,300
!
66,000
73,300
53,000
32,600 I
36,000
58,600
81,100
39,600
89,200
65,400
43,400
|
97,700
70,600
47,400
77,000
106,500
51,500
|
83,700
115,800
55,700
90,600
125.500
135,500
97,900
60,200
j
64,800 1
145,800
106,800
69,600
113,200
156,700
167,900
121,300
74,600
|
129,600
79,800
179,400
138,300
85,100
!
191.400
UNLIMITED UNLIMITED UNLIMITED !
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APPENDIX lll-B
FIRE HYDRANT LOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION
1. SCOPE
Fire hydrants shall be provided for the protection of all buildings or portions of
buildings hereafter constructed. Fire hydrants shall be provided along required
fire apparatus access roadways and adjacent public streets.
2. NUMBER OF HYDRANTS
The minimum number of hydrants available to a building shall be not less than
that listed in Table No. III-B-A. The number of hydrants available to a complex or
subdivision shall not be less than that determined by spacing requirements listed
on Table No. III-B-A when applied tofireapparatus access roadways and perimeter public streets from which fire operations may be conducted.
Existing hydrants on public streets may be considered available unless fire
apparatus access roadways extend between properties and easements are established to prevent their obstruction.
3. DISTRIBUTION OF HYDRANTS
The average spacing betweenfirehydrants shall not exceed that listed on Table
No. III-B-A, except mat the chief may accept a deficiency of up to 10 percent
where existing hydrants provide all or a portion of the required fire hydrant
service.
Regardless of the average spacing, no point on the street or access roadway
adjacent to a building shall be farther from a hydrant than that distance listed in the
last column of Table No. III-B-A.
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TABLE NO. IH-B-A
NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF RRE HYDRANTS
Fine FLOW
REQUIREMENT

MINIMUM
NO. OF
HYDRANTS

750-1750
1
2000-2250
2
2500
3
3000
3
4
35GXMO00
4500-5000
5
5500
6
6000
6
6500-7000
7
1 7500 or more Sorroore4

MAXIMUM DISTANCE FROM
AVERAGE SPACING
HYORANT TO ANY POINT ON
BETWEEN HYORANTS1 2 5 STREET OR ROADWAY FRONTAGES

(ft)
500
450
450
400
350
300
300
250
250
200

(ft)
250
225
225
225
210
180
180
150
150
120

'Reduce by 100 feet for dead-end streets or roadways.
^Where streets are provided with median dividers which can be crossed by fire fighters
pulling hose lines, or arterial streets are provided with four or more traffic lanes and have a
traffic count of more than 30,000 vehicles per day, hydrant spacing shall average 500 feet
on each side of the street and be arranged on an alternating basis up to a fire-flow
requirement of 7000 gpm and 400 feet for higher fire-flow requirements.
Reduce by 50 feet for dead-end streets or roadways.
One hydrant for each 1000 gpm or fraction thereof.
*Where new water mains are extended along streets where hydrants are not needed for
protection of structures or similar fire problems, fire hydrants should be provided at not
less than 1000-foot spacing to provide for transportation hazards.
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